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Abstract—We present a dynamic security management frame-
work where security policies are specified according to situa-
tions. A situation allows to logically group dynamic constraints
and make policies closer to business. Situations are specified
and calculated by using complex events processing techniques
and security policies are written in XACMLv3. Finally, the
framework is supported by a modular event based deployment
infrastructure. The whole framework has been implemented and
its performance is evaluated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mission of IT security teams in organizations that
consisted in Protect to minimize risk has shift to Protect to
enable [1]. Security professionals should stop focusing on
locking down assets advocating that priority is security. This
approach, which constrains employees, is counterproductive to
organizations. Security has to adapt itself to propose solutions
that enable new business activities and new ways of working.
In other words, the ideal security must allow organizations to
grow in a secure way.
New technologies might enhance the employees’ productiv-
ity, accelerate business processes and represent uncharted busi-
ness opportunities. However, new technologies can also bring
new threats and risks requiring additional security measures.
In parallel, new threats and new vulnerabilities are reported
continuously on the media. Consequently, security has to
evolve on an ongoing basis. Thus, the security enforcement
process should be flexible to quickly adapt the organization
security to new usages/technologies and new threats.
To cope with new usages/technologies requirements, secu-
rity management systems have to automate the enforcement
of security measures. Mobility of employees or short term
projects enhance the business agility. However, allowing only
the right people to access the right assets under the right
conditions (temporal, geographical, circumstances, etc) entails
considering dynamic constraints that leads to dynamic security
permissions.
In this article, we present dynSMAUG , our dynamic se-
curity management framework. The specificity of our ap-
proach consists in considering the concept of situation as
the cornerstone of security management and we write poli-
cies herewith “when situation and conditions then security
actions”. On the one hand, situations allow to capture the
dynamic constraints (time, location, etc.) and organize them
into a stable and logical concept. Situation oriented security
policies are simpler and more readable. Also, managing high
level policies, close to business, reduces the gap between
security requirements and the effective security policy exe-
cuted by security devices, and then limits the security policy
translation errors. On the other hand, making security policy
more independent from technical constraints minimizes the
impact of changing security mechanisms and simplifies the
policy life cycle management. Situations are calculated by
applying Complex Event Processing (CEP) techniques. CEP
provides rich operators for describing complex situations that
combines data from multiple sources. Policies are specified
in XACMLv3. This standard implements the Attribute Based
Access Control paradigm which makes the language highly
flexible. In addition, this language supports both authorization
and obligations. Finally, dynSMAUG includes a deployment
infrastructure that dynamically enforces security policies. Its
modular architecture facilitates the integration of new security
mechanisms.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II
describes the problem highlighting the limits of security policy
languages and architectures. In Section III, we present our
proposition. We propose our definition of the word situation
and we detail the specification of situations and situation based
security policies. Section IV shows the deployment architec-
ture and the performance evaluation of its implementation.
Section V summarizes the related works. Finally, Section VI
concludes and provides some perspectives for the future.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
In order to clearly state the problem, we first summarize the
different existing approaches for managing security. Then, we
present a scenario showing the limitations of these approaches.
A. Security management approaches
Policy based management (PBM) is a recognized and well
established approach for managing complex systems now. One
of the key motivations of this approach is flexibility and
adaptability to existing infrastructure and change management.
Policies represent an externalized logic that can determine the
behavior of managed systems [2]. The architecture supporting
this approach consists of a policy decision point (PDP) that
interprets the policy and takes decision based on it, and a
policy enforcement point (PEP) that compels the managed
system to execute the decisions of the PDP.
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If these generic concepts are common to all PBM solutions,
two modes of deployments exist [3] which differ in how poli-
cies are specified and how the PEP and the PDP interact (See
figure 1). The outsourcing mode is mainly implemented by
authorization management systems. When a protected resource
is being accessed, the PEP catches this access attempt and
sends a request to the PDP. Based on its policies, the PDP
takes its decision and transmits it to the PEP. The later applies
the decision by granting this requested access or blocking it.
In this deployment mode, interactions between the PEP and
the PDP are synchronous. The PDP always sends a decision
to a PEP as a transaction reply to a specific request. The
policy languages of outsourcing mode systems are of the form
‘condition then permit/deny’. Examples of such systems are
PERMIS [4], XACMLv3 [5].
On the other hand, the provisioning mode is more suitable
for deploying security configurations. In this mode, the PDP
receives an event from any sensor that triggers the decision-
making process. The PDP can then transmit its decision to
any PEP. Here, the interaction is asynchronous since the
PEP can receive a decision from the PDP without having
previously requested it. The policy languages of provisioning
mode systems are of the form ‘On event if condition then
action’. PONDER [6] is an example of such systems.
Fig. 1. Policy-Based management: Outsourcing and Provisionning modes
B. Scenario
We present in this section the scenario used in the rest of
the article. It consists of a company working with sensible
data that wants to prevent them from being compromised. The
Information System Security Policy (ISSP) is the following :
Only owners can use their assigned computer. Whenever the
owner of a device is not behind his/her computer, then the
session shall be locked. The owner of a device is the em-
ployee who has been assigned to this device. Since employees
sometimes forget to lock their session and put sensible data
at risk of being disclosed, the company decided to automate
this task.
The enterprise proposes a solution to improve the policy
by locating both users and computers. Consequently, when
the owner is moving far from his associated device (e.g., the
user exits the room), the session must be automatically locked.
In the next sections, we call this rule REACTIVE-RULE. In
addition, if someone tries to connect to the computer when
the owner is far from his device, the connection must be
refused and a notification message (SMS, email, etc.) must
be sent to the owner. In the rest of the article, this rule is
called DENY-AUTHZ-RULE. Finally, connection is allowed if
the login/password is valid and the owner is in front of his
device (rule PERMIT-AUTHZ-RULE).
In a first implementation, the company decided to locate
every computer based on its GPS chip that regularly sends its
coordinates. After agreeing with the employees upon privacy
issues, the company also chooses to use the GPS system
embedded in their smartphones. Using this tracking solu-
tion, REACTIVE-RULE, DENY-AUTHZ-RULE and PERMIT-
AUTHZ-RULE can be rephrased as following:
REACTIVE-RULEv1
if the distance between the positions of the owner and his
computer becomes greater than X meters then lock the
session
DENY-AUTHZ-RULEv1
if (the connection to a computer is authenticated) and
(the distance between the positions of the computer and
its owner is greater than X meters) then refuse the
connection and send an alert to the owner
PERMIT-AUTHZ-RULEv1
if (the connection to a computer is authenticated) and (the
distance between the positions of the computer and its
owner is less than X meters) then permit the connection
After a testing period, the company realized that the GPS
signal is not correctly received in all its premises. In addition,
the computer can be within X meters of its owner and not
within sight (e.g., there is a wall between the computer and the
user, or they are on different floors). Thus, the first mechanism
poorly implements the ISSP. To improve the security solution,
the company decided to use an indoor positioning system that
combines GPS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth Low Energy, and motion
sensors. This system is able to determine in which room
computers and users are. Being more precise than the basic
GPS positioning, the indoor positioning system provides the
required accuracy to achieve the ISSP. However, introducing
this new technology impacts the expression of REACTIVE-
RULE, DENY-AUTHZ-RULE and DENY-AUTHZ-RULE that
become:
REACTIVE-RULEv2
if (the owner and his computer are in the same room) and
(the owner or the computer is leaving the room) then lock
the session
DENY-AUTHZ-RULEv2
if (the connection to a computer is authenticated) and (the
owner is not in the same room as that computer) then
refuse the connection and send an alert to the owner
PERMIT-AUTHZ-RULEv2
if (the connection to a computer is authenticated) and (the
owner is in the same room as that computer) then permit
the connection
This example highlights the two following issues:
Issue 1 : We refined each ISSP rule into two different ver-
sions, one version for each position tracking technology.
In other words, the final security rules depend on the
technology. New security rules will be added each time a
new security related-technology is introduced. This will
result in an unmanageable security policy. The security
policy shall not depend on technology.
Issue 2 : Enforcing this ISSP requires a security management
architecture that supports both outsourcing and provision-
ing modes. On the one hand, REACTIVE-RULE requires
the management system to dynamically deploy a new
security measure on the computers (lock the session)
when an external event is received (the owner is moving
far away). On the other hand, the outsouring mode fits
with DENY-AUTHZ-RULE and PERMIT-AUTHZ-RULE.
In the next section, we propose our solution for specifying
in a unified way technology independent security policies.
III. EXPRESSION OF SECURITY POLICIES DRIVEN BY
SITUATIONS
We propose to make security policies independent from se-
curity mechanisms by specifying them according to situations.
Our general idea consists in describing how situations arise on
one side and specifying security policies oriented by situations
on the other side. Both tasks can be performed in parallel.
A. Definition of situation
Although the word situation is commonly employed in
ordinary, legal or even technical domains, clearly defining
it is difficult and many definitions have been published [7].
Especially, situation is often interchanged with the word
context. We present in this section our interpretation of the
concept of situation and its differences with the concept of
context.
Words situation and context are frequently employed in the
domain of pervasive computing when dealing with context-
awareness. Dey [8] has proposed one of the most popular
definitions of context in this community. According to him,
“context is any information that can be used to characterize
the situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or
object that is considered relevant to the interaction between a
user and an application, including the user and applications
themselves.” This definition highlights some characteristics of
the relation between context and situation: context is used
to determine situation. Hence, situation is something more
abstract than context. Dey has also introduced one definition
of situation as “The situation abstraction is [...] a description
of the states of relevant entities.”.
Situational awareness is another domain that studied the
concept of situation. Endsley [9] defines situational awareness
as the perception of the elements in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning,
and the projection of their status in the near future. This
definition stresses two other points: situation is related to
multiple entities and understanding situation means being able
to project in the future.
Finally, Barwise and Perry [10] wrote on situation: The
world consists not just of objects, or of objects, properties
and relations, but of objects having properties and standing
in relations to one another. And there are parts of the world,
clearly recognized [...]. These parts of the world are called
situations.
As a consequence, from a security management point of
view, context is any instantaneous, detectable, and relevant in-
formation of the managed environment. The managed system
is the world as defined in [10] and the context is all perceived
information representing this world. More concretely, context
is any data collected by sensors such as monitoring sys-
tems, intrusion detection systems, configuration management
databases, etc. Situation is the result of computing relation-
ships between parts of the managed entities included in the
known context. The created relationships focus on one or all of
the classic questions: who, when, where, why, what and how.
We call the managed entities of interest as the target of the
situation. In addition, situations convey meaning and provide
abstraction of the context. They allow decision-making entities
to understand what is happening and what could happen in the
future. Thus, situations facilitates the decision making.
Our scenario in section II-B incorporates two situations:
the user is close to his/her computer and (s)he is far from
it. These two situations characterize a geographical relation
between a user and his computer (Figure 2). In addition, these
situations are closely related to each other forming a directed
graph. We say both situations are in the same situation class.
We propose the concept situation class to group situations
logically. All situations of the same class must have the same
situation target that constitutes the focus of the situation class.
The other entities, which don’t appear in all situations, are part
of the context of the situation target and may change between
situations of the same class.
In addition, describing the dynamics of the context as graph
of situations facilitates the specification of security policies.
For instance, the scenario ISSP is directly translated to:
• When the situation is close, the user can connect to his
computer (PERMIT-AUTHZ-RULE);
• When the situation is far, nobody can connect to the
computer and if someone tries to log in, the owner should
be notified (DENY-AUTHZ-RULE);
• When the situation is moving from close to far, the
session of the computer should be locked automatically
(REACTIVE-RULE).
How situations close and far are calculated depends on the
sensors and data available for computing the context.
B. Specification of situations
A situation is a particular time frame of interest that has
a beginning, a life span and an end [11]. The beginning and
the end of a situation are determined by combining multiple
events coming from multiple sensors and occurring at different
moments. Indeed, a situation involves multiple entities and
situation 'close'
The owner is 
close to his 
computer
situation 'far'
The owner is far 
from his 
computer
the owner and the 
computer are not in 
the same room
OR
The distance between 
the owner and the 
computer is greater 
than X meters
the owner and the 
computer are in the 
same room
OR
The distance between 
the owner and the 
computer is less than 
X meters
Context events:
  new GPS coordinates of the computer
  new GPS coordinates of the owner
  owner leaves room X, owner enters room X
  computer leaves room X, computer enters room X
Situation class - physical distance between a computer and its owner
startFar/endClose
startClose/endFar
Fig. 2. Situations in our scenario
multiple conditions. The beginning and the end of a situa-
tion cannot be simple events captured by a unique sensor.
In addition, events being instantaneous, combining multiple
events requires complex temporal operators (event ordering,
event existence/absence, time windows, etc.) to specify the
beginning and end of situations.
In our scenario, the beginning and the end of situations close
(referring to ‘the user is close to his/her computer’) and far
(referring to ‘the user is far from his/her computer’) should
be computed based on events related to both the user and the
computer (see Figure 2). In addition, different combinations of
events can determine the beginning and the end of the same
situation. For instance, situation far starts when two events
GPS position of the user and GPS position of the computer
indicate that the distance between both protagonists is greater
than X meters. Situation far also starts when applying a
function on the events signalling that entities are entering or
leaving rooms results in determining that the computer and its
owner are located in two different rooms.
We follow the Complex Event Processing (CEP) approach
for computing the beginning and the end of situations. CEP
is “a defined set of tools and techniques for analyzing and
controlling the complex series of interrelated events that drive
modern distributed information systems” [12]. CEP solutions
allow to specify complex events through complex event pat-
terns that match incoming event notifications on the basis of
their content as well as some ordering relationships on them.
Cugola and Margara [13] have published an extended survey
of CEP solutions.
We choose the open source event processing implementation
called Esper, which is maintained by Espertech1. For speci-
fying complex event patterns, Esper offers a stream-oriented
language called Event Processing Language (EPL) that is an
1http://www.espertech.com/esper/
extension of SQL for processing events. EPL includes all
the classical operators of SQL, as well as new features for
windows definition and interaction, for timed-data arithmetic
definition, and for complex event output generation.
In our scenario, situation close begins when situation far
ends (Figure 2). Since complex events startFar and startClose
are respectively similar to endClose and endFar, identifying
situations close and far consists in expressing in EPL the two
complex events startFar/endClose and startClose/endFar.
1 startFar = select * from
2 Phone-GPS_Event.win:time(6 sec)
3 as phone,
4 Laptop_GPS_Event.win:time(6 sec)
5 as laptop,
6 Active_Situation.std:lastevent()
7 as current-situation
8 where
9 phone.owner = laptop.owner and
10 gpsDistance(
11 phone.long, phone.lat,
12 laptop.long, laptop.lat) > 10 and
13 current-situation.situation-class =
14 "distance-between-laptop-and-owner" and
15 current-situation.situation-target =
16 laptop.owner and
17 not current-situation.value = "far"
Fig. 3. Situation ”far” using GPS
The specification of the beginning and the end of situations
depends on the input events and the characteristics of the
sensors. Figure 3 is the EPL description of startFar of the
first implementation of the ISSP, i.e. when the location of users
and computers is determined by their GPS positions only. In
our example, GPS sensors send the GPS position every 10
seconds. This EPL rule states that 1) in the last time window
of 6 seconds, there is an event representing the GPS position
of a smartphone (lines 2-3) and another for the position of a
computer (lines 4-5) such that they belong to the same owner
(line 9) and the distance is greater than 10 meters (lines 10-
12) while the last current situation is not far (lines 13-17).
Since GPS sends coordinates every 10 seconds, we are sure
to receive the coordinates of both the user and the computer
within 6 seconds and then we can limit the time window for
comparing GPS coordinates to this period.
In the second implementation, which consists in the indoor
positioning system, indoor position sensors trigger events
when smartphones or computers are entering in a new room.
This changes the way that complex event startFar is cal-
culated to either the user or the computer has moved to
another room while both were initially in the same room.
The indoor positioning system provided by PoleStar used in
project Box@PME takes between 0 to 10 seconds to calculate
the position of a device2. Therefore, there may be a delay
of 10 seconds between the time a device actually moves
to another room (the world has changed) and the time the
event reporting this change is actually received (the context
is actually updated). Thus, situation far starts when there is
2this constraint of 10 seconds is specific to our lab experimentation
event computer enters room X (or smartphone enters room X)
while the current situation is close, and no event smartphone
enters room X (or computer enters room X) is triggered
within 10 seconds. To translate this statement in EPL, we
specify event startFar in two steps (see Figure 4). First,
we compute two complex events: i) MayBeFarEvent states
either the smartphone (lines 4-5) or the computer (lines 6-
7) of the same owner (line 11) moves to another room (line
12) while the current situation is close (lines 13-17), and
ii) MayBeCloseEvent when the smartphone (lines 22-23) or
the computer (lines 24-25) moves to a room such that both
devices are then in the same room (line 30) and while the
current situation is far (lines 31-35). These complex events
are not the beginning or end of a situation. They will be re-
injected in the CEP system. The beginning of situation far
can be computed when an event MayBeFarEvent has been
triggered (line 38) and after waiting 10 seconds (line 39) no
event MayBeCloseEvent appears for the same owner (line 40).
1 maybeFarEvent = insert into MayBeFarEvent
2 select phone.owner as owner, phone, laptop
3 from
4 Phone_Geofencing_Event.std:unique(owner)
5 as phone,
6 Laptop_Geofencing_Event.std:unique(owner)
7 as laptop,
8 Active_Situation.std:lastevent()
9 as current-situation
10 where
11 laptop.owner = phone.owner and
12 not phone.location = laptop.location and
13 current-situation.situation-class =
14 "distance-between-laptop-and-owner" and
15 current-situation.situation-target =
16 laptop.owner and
17 current-situation.value = "close"
18
19 maybeCloseEvent = insert into MayBeCloseEvent
20 select phone.owner as owner, phone, laptop
21 from
22 Phone_Geofencing_Event.std:unique(owner)
23 as phone,
24 Laptop_Geofencing_Event.std:unique(owner)
25 as laptop,
26 Active_Situation.std:lastevent()
27 as current-situation
28 where
29 laptop.owner = phone.owner and
30 phone.location = laptop.location and
31 current-situation.situation-class =
32 "distance-between-laptop-and-owner" and
33 current-situation.situation-target =
34 laptop.owner and
35 current-situation.value = "far"
36
37 startFar = select * from pattern [
38 every(mayBeFarEvent=MayBeFarEvent ->
39 timer:interval(10sec) and
40 not MayBeCloseEvent(owner=mayBeFarEvent.owner))]
Fig. 4. Situation ”far” using indoor positioning
C. Specification of situation-Based security policies
In our approach, situations are specified outside the security
policy. Therefore, the security policy can refer to them only
without requiring to describe them. As a result, we represent
security policies in a generic way as : when situation and some
condition then authorization decision and/or obligation(s). As
highlighted in section II-B, the security policy language shall
allow the security administrator to specify both reactive and
authorization rules. These two kinds of rules can be easily
written following these patterns:
reactive rules : when situation and situation begins [and
some condition] then obligation(s)
authorization rules : when situation and some condition
about the requested access [and some other condition]
then authorization decision and/or obligation(s)
We propose to express our security policies in XACMLv3
[5], which is standardized by the OASIS. First, it follows
the Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) approach [14]
where policies describe general access control requirements
in term of constraints on security attributes; attributes being
any characteristics of entities. Hence, “the rules or policies
that can be implemented in an ABAC model are limited
only to the degree imposed by the computational language”
[14]. Initially, XACML policy only considered attributes of
the subject, the resource, the action and the environment.
However, OASIS resolved this issue since version 3 and it
is now possible to consider any managed entities thanks to
the concept of categories. In addition, the XACMLv3 policy
language includes obligations. Thus, XACMLv3 is not limited
to PERMIT/DENY decisions only and can also describe com-
plex decisions involving the modification of managed entities.
Finally, the XACMLv3 language is extensible [15], [16].
However, XACML is a verbose XML language which
makes difficult to write or read security policies [17]. Abbrevi-
ated Language for Authorization (ALFA) [18] has overcome
this issue. ALFA provides the means to present XACMLv3
policies in compact forms. It does not increase nor reduce
the semantics of XACMLv3 but provides human-readable
policies. The translation between ALFA and XACMLv3 must
be explicitly defined in mapping files.
Figure 5 shows the three security rules of our example in
ALFA. It is worth to notice that this policy in ALFA is close
to the original ISSP stated in section II-B, which limits the
errors when translating a high level security policy into a target
security policy language. The rule called reactive rule means:
when the value of situation class Situation laptop owner is
far (line 4) and the situation begins (line 5) then obligation:
lock the session of the related user (lines 7-10). Attribute
recipient in the obligation (line 8) indicates where to enforce
the obligation. If attribute recipient is not filled, the obligation
is returned to the management entity that requested a decision.
The second rule deny authz rule involves three entities: a
situation, a resource and an action. It states: when the value of
situation class Situation laptop owner is far (line 17) and an
authenticated connection on the resource has been performed
(line 18) then the authorization decision is deny (line 15) and
obligation: send a notification on the smartphone of the owner
(line 19-23). Finally, the last rule allows access (line 28) when
the value of situation class Situation laptop owner is close
(line 30) and the connection is authenticated (line 31).
1 rule reactive_rule {
2 permit
3 target clause
4 Situation_laptop_owner.value == "far"
5 and Situation_laptop_owner.state=="begin"
6 on permit{
7 obligation Obligations.lockSession {
8 Attribute.recipient=
9 Situation_laptop_owner.situation-target
10 Attribute.device="laptop"}
11 }
12 }
13
14 rule deny_authz_rule {
15 deny
16 target clause
17 Situation_laptop_owner.value == "far"
18 and Action.name=="authenticated-connection"
19 on deny{
20 obligation Obligations.notifyUser {
21 Attribute.recipient=
22 Situation_laptop_owner.situation-target
23 Attribute.device="smartphone" }
24 }
25 }
26
27 rule permit_authz_rule {
28 permit
29 target clause
30 Situation_laptop_owner.value == "close"
31 and Action.name == "authenticated-connection"
32 }
Fig. 5. Our example ISSP Policy in ALFA
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY POLICIES DRIVEN BY
SITUATIONS
Now, we present the deployment architecture of
dynSMAUG and its performance evaluation.
A. The deployment infrastructure
The architecture of dynSMAUG aims at allowing the dep-
loyment of security policies in both outsourcing and provi-
sioning modes (Figure 6). In that way, we first split the PEP
entity into its two basic functionalities: the sensor role that
captures events in the managed system and the actuator role
that enforces policy decisions. The PEP in the outsourcing
mode (Figure 1) plays both roles: it is a sensor when it sends
a decision request to the PDP and an actuator when it enforces
the returned decision. In the provisioning mode, it only plays
the role of actuator while the management entity that detected
the event played the role sensor. Secondly, we consider every
messages as events to unify the interactions between the
sensors/actuators and the PDP. Hence, the protocol in the
outsourcing mode consists in two events (one for the request
and the other for the decision) while the protocol in the
provisioning mode is a unique event (i.e., the decision).
The actors of our deployment architecture are shown in
Figure 6:
• The broker is the distribution middleware that transmits
all the events between the actors following the publish-
subscribe pattern. The broker divides events into three
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Fig. 6. Architecture of dynSMAUG
topics: the context events, the situation events and the
decision events.
• The sensors produce data events of the context (noted c
in Figure 6). A context event can be the GPS coordinates,
the user exiting a room, or an attempt to access a
protected resource. An event is defined in XACMLv3 by
a set of attributes of the form <identifier, type, value>.
This solution has an advantage: it is possible to develop
sensors in any programming language.
• The situation manager contains a complex event pro-
cessing engine that calculates situations according to a
situations specification as explained in section III-B. It
consumes context events and produces situation events
(noted s in Figure 6). Situation events have the same for-
mat as context events and are also carried in XACMLv3
requests. Each time a new situation is calculated, the
situation manager creates two situations events: the first
event informs the beginning of the new situation and the
second one notifies the end of the last active situation.
• The command center is the brain of our security manage-
ment framework. It consumes both context and situation
events and produces decision events (noted d in Figure 6).
As explained in section III-C, we specify security policies
in XACMLv3. However, the XACML PDP only imple-
ments the outsourcing mode. Therefore, the command
center includes an XACMLv3 PDP and a decision proxy.
The main objective of the decision proxy is to allow
the command center to operate both outsourcing and
provisioning modes. The context and situation events are
received by the decision proxy. Then, the decision proxy
transmits the events to the PDP and wait for the decision.
The PDP acts in compliance with XACMLv3. When
the decision proxy receives the decision from the PDP,
it determines the actuators to which the decision shall
be distributed based on its configuration management
database.
• The actuators only consume decision events. An actuator
checks if it is the recipient of decisions and enforces them
if so. Like sensors, it is possible to develop actuators in
any programming language.
B. Implementation and Tests
This section covers the implementation of the system and
the results obtained after running tests on the scenario des-
cribed in Section II-B. We implemented our scenario using the
indoor positioning system in our laboratory where we installed
a set of PoleStar3 indoor positioning beacons. Due to size limit
we cannot describe it in the article, however, a video showing
our experimentation in our lab is available for watching4.
The message broker is an Apache ActiveMQ server. We
use Esper from EsperTech to develop the situation manager.
The command center is built based on Balana, an XACMLv3
engine provided by WSO2. The policy editor is the eclipse
plug-in that Axiomatics have developed to write ALFA poli-
cies. We also use the Balana API in all the components for
generating/parsing XACMLv3 request and decision messages.
Finally, we employed the java ActiveMQ SSL connector on
Linux to allow each component to communicate with the
broker; all components (Command center, Situation manager,
Sensors and Actuators) are authenticated on the broker by an
SSL certificate.
We have tested the first implementation of our scenario
where laptops and smartphones send their GPS coordinates.
In order to evaluate the performance of the broker, the sit-
uation manager, and the command center, we installed all
the components on the same machine, which is a MacBook
Pro with a 2.8GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 8Go 1600MHz
DDR3 memory and a 256Go SSD drive. In this simulation
environment, one java thread simulates the GPS sensors of the
laptop and the smartphone for one user and a java thread plays
the role of the actuators in laptops. Each simulation compels
dynSMAUG to execute the complete process from context
events sent by sensors to the reception of the decision by an
actuator, i.e., reception of the GPS coordinates from laptop and
smartphone, calculus of the situation, reception of the situation
event by the command center, decision making process and
reception of the decision by the actuator. We simulate 100
users. Each sensor sends a GPS coordinates update event
every 10 seconds. Each simulation lasts 50 executions of the
complete process for each user. Thus, we obtained the time of
5000 executions of the process.
The results obtained by the simulation show that the whole
process took between 5ms and 91ms. 99% of all process
executions were achieved in less than 19ms. The distribution
3http://www.polestar.eu/
4https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-PPoWO4n0-XZWRsa21IWEVKNE0
Fig. 7. Distribution of process execution times (total 5000 executions)
in Figure 7 shows a spike corresponding to 1674 process
executions completed in 8ms. It represents around 30% of all
the process executions. The other distinctive spike in the graph
is at 17ms with 186 process executions. This test partially
validates the viability of our system. However, these values
should be weighted because of the small number of EPL and
XACML rules.
V. RELATED WORKS
Different research works have proposed to introduce the
concept of context to allow dynamic permissions. For instance,
Shebaro et al. [19] have included the context in the Android
permissions management to support dynamic privileges. Here,
context is a time interval and a physical location. The physical
location is an abstract context information calculated based on
GPS, cells and WIFI signals. This approach can not be easily
extended to include more context information and policies
are complex since they include all the technical details about
what a physical location is. Bonati et al. [20] have extended
the RBAC model to support reactive policies. Roles (and
then permissions) can be activated/deactivated according to
three context information: location, time and event that is
“the description of other relevant measurable features of the
context”. This approach is limited to three context information
and doesn’t structure the dynamics of the world, contrary to
the concept of situation. Finally, Son et al. [21] have analyzed
deeper the notion of context and propose to express access
control policies according to six axes of context: who, when,
where, why, what and how. If this work seems close to what
we call situation, they don’t separate context from the policy
and the dynamics is not structured.
As far as we know, only few researchers introduced the
concept of situation in the security management process ex-
plicitly. Kim and Lim [22] have proposed Situation-Aware-
RBAC, an extension of RBAC (Role Based Access Control)
which dynamically grants roles to users thanks to a situation-
aware matrix. This work mixes different context information
for building a situation. However, the situation aware matrix is
limited and only supports the specification of basic situations.
Yau et al. [23] have presented a situation-aware access control
approach that integrates situation-awareness capability and
RBAC. They propose a dedicated language for specifying
situations. However, this language is limited comparing to
Complex Event Processing languages and the specification
of the situation is included inside the policy. Kayes et al.
[24] have described an ontological framework for situation-
aware access control. They proposed to formalize the concept
of situation and context in an ontology. However, they have
a different perspective about what a situation is. Unlike us,
their approach focuses mainly on the purpose of access only.
Finally, we presented a preliminary work in [25] that advocates
the necessity of a situation manager. We applied our idea for
implementing the Break-the-Glass mechanism [26]. However,
our work was limited to authorization management and the
deployment architecture was in a nascent state.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented in this article, dynSMAUG, a framework
that aims at making management of security more flexible
and adaptive. The specificity of our approach consists in
considering the concept of situation as the cornerstone of the
security management. Situations allow to capture the dynamic
constraints (time, location, workflows, etc.) and organize them
into a stable and logical concept. We created a situation man-
ager by applying Complex Event Processing (CEP) techniques.
Since situation are calculated by the situation manager, the
command center can consider them in its decision making
process. We propose to specify situation oriented security
policies in ALFA that simplifies XACMLv3 while keeping
its expressiveness. Finally, we presented an infrastructure
that supports both outsourcing and provisioning deployment
modes. We performed different tests to evaluate our solution.
We plan to improve our calculus of situation by including
the assessment of the situation assurance. Situations are de-
duced based on the context. However, the context information
is intrinsically inaccurate and doesn’t represent correctly the
managed world. E.g, the accuracy of GPS coordinates is 5
meters, there is a delay up to 10 seconds with the indoor
positioning system, etc. Therefore, we want to integrate the
concept of Quality of Context [27] in the calculus of situations.
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